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COMMUNITY PRESSURE AND CLEAN TECHNOLOGY IN THE INFORMAL
SECTOR: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE ADOPTION OF PROPANE
BY TRADITIONAL MEXICAN BRICKMAKERS
Allen Blackman and Geoffrey J. Bannister1
1.   INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding a recent explosion of interest in Third World environmental issues, to
date there has been very little research on the problem of pollution emitted by "informal" firms
-- low-technology micro-enterprises operating outside the purview of the state.  Such firms
have multiplied rapidly during the last several decades as a consequence of persistent
population growth, rural-urban migration, and government efforts to tax and regulate.  Today
they constitute a key economic sector in most developing countries.  In Africa and Latin
America they typically employ over half of the non-agricultural labor force (Ranis and Stewart,
1994) and are responsible for twenty to forty percent of GDP (Biller and Quintero, 1995).  A
significant percentage of informal firms are engaged in industry, including pollution intensive
activities such as tanning, brick and tile making, automotive repair, wood finishing,
metalworking, electroplating, and small-scale mining.  For example, in Mexico, thirty-eight
percent of informal firms are classified as industrial (US Department of Labor, 1992).  What
little research exists confirms that informal firms can be serious polluters (e.g., Biller and
Quintero, 1995; Hamza, 1991; UNEP, 1987).  Given the sheer number of such firms in
developing countries, their aggregate impact on the environment is likely to be significant.
But pollution control in the informal sector is exceptionally challenging, even by
developing country standards, for four reasons.  First, by definition, informal firms have few
preexisting ties to the state.  Second, such firms are difficult to monitor since they are small,
numerous, and geographically dispersed.  Third, intensely competitive informal firms are
under considerable pressure to cut costs regardless of the environmental impacts.  And finally,
informal firms sustain the poorest of the poor.  As a consequence, they may appear to both
regulators and the public as less appropriate targets for regulation than larger, wealthier firms.
Given these constraints, conventional command and control regulation is likely to be
problematic if not completely impractical.  To be effective, environmental management in the
informal sector will have to be innovative.
                                               
1 The authors are, respectively: Fellow, Quality of the Environment Division, Resources for the Future; and
Assistant Professor, Anderson Schools of Management, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.  We are
grateful to Billy Pizer, Anna Alberini, Ray Kopp, two anonymous referees, our excellent research assistants,
Brian Kropp and Maria Elena Melendez, and our student enumerators in Cd. Juárez, Magda Alarcon, Pablo
Reyes, and Simon Vega.  Special thanks to FEMAP, Octavio Chavez, Nancy Lowery, Carlos Rincon, and the
brickmakers of Cd. Juárez.  Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Tinker Foundation.
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Recently, clean technologies -- new technologies that mitigate environmental impacts
without significantly raising production costs -- have received a great deal of attention as a
means of surmounting barriers to conventional environmental regulation in developing countries.
The hope is that firms will adopt such technologies voluntarily or at least with minimal prodding,
easing the burden on regulatory authorities.  General endorsements of clean technologies are
contained in both the seminal 1987 Brundtland Commission Report to the U.N. (World
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987), and the equally influential 1992 World
Bank Development Report on Development and the Environment (World Bank, 1992), and a
number of anecdotal studies have emerged in the last several years, (e.g., Almeida, 1993; and
Maltzou, 1992).  Yet, to our knowledge, there has been no rigorous research on why informal
firms (or even small-scale firms) do and do not adopt clean technologies.  The well-developed
empirical and theoretical literature on the diffusion of small-scale cost-saving innovations in
developing countries is certainly broadly relevant, but it does not have much to say about the
regulation, externalities, and peculiar political-economy considerations that undoubtedly have a
significant impact on the diffusion of clean technologies.  From a policy perspective, this gap in
the literature is lamentable.  Even though efforts to promote clean technologies among informal
sector firms are already underway, we have virtually no empirical research to guide policy.
As a first step towards filling this gap we present the results of an econometric analysis
of the diffusion of propane among informal 'traditional' brickmakers in Cd. Juárez, Mexico.
Our overall aim is to identify the principal determinants of the adoption of propane in Cd. Juárez
and to explore the implications for environmental management in developing countries.
The two key policy implications of our analysis are that: (1) it is possible to
successfully promote the adoption of a clean technology by intensely competitive informal
firms even when the new technology significantly raises variable costs, and (2) community
pressure applied by competing firms and private-sector local organizations can generate
incentives for adoption, presumably even in the absence of formal regulatory pressure.
The paper is organized as follows.  The second section provides some background on
traditional brickmaking in Cd. Juárez.  The third section reviews the literature on the adoption
of clean technologies and small-scale productivity enhancing technologies.  The fourth
section describes analytical and econometric models.  The fifth section discusses data.  The
sixth section discusses our results.  And the last section summarizes and concludes.
2.   BACKGROUND:  TRADITIONAL BRICKMAKING IN CD. JUÁREZ
Principally fired with refuse such as used tires and scrap wood that is often impregnated
with toxic varnishes, Cd. Juárez's approximately 300 traditional brick kilns are frequently cited
as the third or fourth leading contributor to air pollution in both Cd. Juárez and its sister city,
El Paso, Texas.2  Though brick kilns are primarily associated with carbon monoxide and
                                               
2 See, e.g., Johnson, Soto, and Ward (1994); and Mendoza (1995).  Though widely used, this statistic is
undocumented.  According to the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission, no emissions inventory
has ever been performed for Cd. Juárez.Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
3
particulate emissions, depending on the fuels used, they also emit volatile organic compounds,
nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, heavy metals, and carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse
gas (Johnson et al., 1994).  Traditional kiln emissions constitute an urgent environmental
problem as air quality in Cd. Juárez and El Paso is the worst on the US-Mexican border and
among the worst in North America (Nuñez et al., 1994).3
In addition to contributing to city-wide pollution, traditional kilns are a serious local
health hazard to those living in and near Cd. Juárez's eight brickmaking colonias.4  When
brickmakers first squatted in these colonias twenty-five or thirty years ago, all were situated
on the outskirts of the city.  Over time, however, most have been enveloped by urban sprawl.
As a result, brick kilns were the most frequent subject of complaints (one in every four) to the
Cd. Juárez municipal environmental authority in 1994 (Dirección Municipal de Ecología de
Cd. Juárez, 1995).
Traditional brickmaking in Cd. Juárez is an extremely labor intensive, low-technology
activity.  The four main tasks -- mixing earth and clay, molding the mixture into bricks,
drying the bricks in the sun, and firing them in a primitive adobe kiln -- are all performed by
hand.  It is also very small-scale and low-paying.  On average, each kiln has a capacity of
approximately 10,000 bricks, employs six workers, and generates profits on the order of $100
per month.5  Socioeconomic conditions are poor.  The majority of brickmakers live next to
their kilns in primitive houses with no sewers or running water.  On average, kiln owners have
three years of schooling and approximately a quarter are illiterate (FEMAP, 1991).
Most of Cd. Juarez's brickmakers are associated with one of two rival political factions.
The first is comprised of organizations affiliated with the nationally dominant Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI).6  The second faction is dominated by the Committee for Popular
Defense (CDP) linked to the national Worker's Party.  The CDP has traditionally been opposed
to the political establishment and has resisted all attempts to regulate brickmaking.  In a July
1995 survey of seventy-six owners and managers of brick kilns in Cd. Juárez (described
below), forty-four percent belonged to a PRI affiliate, eighteen percent to the CDP, and the
remaining thirty-eight percent were independent.
In the early 1990s, a binational multi-sector coalition led by a Cd. Juárez-based non-
profit, the Federación Mexicana de Asociaciones Privadas (FEMAP), began an effort to
introduce clean-burning propane into the brick making colonias of Cd. Juárez (for a detailed
history of the project see Blackman and Bannister, 1997).  Faced with a daunting array of
                                               
3 In 1995 the city of El Paso was classified by the US Environmental Protection Agency as a "moderate" non-
attainment area for both carbon monoxide and particulate matter, and El Paso county was classified as a
"serious" non-attainment area for ozone (Parra, 1996).
4 These colonias are:  Anapra, División del Norte, Francisco Villa, Fronteriza Baja, Kilómetro 20, México 68,
Satelite, and Senecu 2.
5 This compares to the March 1996 monthly minimum wage in the north of Mexico of about $64 (Banco de
Mexico, 1996).
6 The three principal PRI affiliates are the Federation of Mexican Workers (CTM), the National Federation of
Citizens' Organizations (FNOC), and the PRI affiliated Brickmakers' Union.Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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obstacles including brickmakers' financing constraints, their seeming indifference to the
adverse health impacts of burning debris, strong competitive pressures to use cheap dirty
fuels, and a virtual absence of regulatory pressure, the coalition put in place a number of
inducements and sanctions aimed at encouraging adoption.  Local propane companies
provided free access to the equipment needed to burn propane.7  Universities developed
technical extension and health education courses.  To improve enforcement of a widely
ignored ban on the burning of debris, the municipal government of Cd. Juárez set up a 'peer-
monitoring' mechanism wherein police were dispatched in response to citizen complaints
about specific kilns burning toxic materials.  Violators were fined and sometimes jailed.8
Finally, project organizers worked with leaders of local trade and community organizations to
pressure brickmakers to adopt propane.  In March of 1993, the leaders of key brickmaker
organizations were brought together to hammer out an agreement on clean fuels and to set
deadline for the adoption of propane.  The PRI affiliates were in general quite cooperative,
enforcing strict rules on permissible fuels in some brickyards.  One important impetus for
adoption developed autonomously as adoption proceeded -- in an effort to avoid being
undercut by competitors using cheap dirty fuels, those brickmakers who adopted pressured
their competitors to switch as well.
Though adoption was frustratingly slow at first, by October 1993, an estimated forty to
seventy percent of brickmakers in Cd. Juárez were using propane, a significant achievement
given the obstacles involved.  Unfortunately, almost all of this progress has been reversed
since 1994 due to nationwide reductions of long-standing Mexican subsidies on propane and a
consequent dramatic increase in the price of propane relative to debris.  Though relatively
short-lived, this episode of adoption offers a rare opportunity to study clean technological
change in the informal sector.
Note that the adoption of propane is best viewed as technological change rather than
simple fuel switching because most brickmakers who adopted incurred substantial fixed costs
in doing so and also made significant adjustments to the production process.  Fixed costs
consisted of transactions costs, learning costs, the costs of procuring a burner (the one piece of
equipment that propane companies did not supply), and for most adopters, the costs of
modifying the kiln to enable it to withstand the intense heat generated by propane.9  A
common change in the production process was a reduction in the number of laborers hired to
help fire the kiln, as propane eliminates the need to continuously shovel fuel into the firebox.
                                               
7 In most cases the equipment was attached to a trailer that was moved from kiln to kiln as needed
8 Though enforcement during this period was relatively vigorous, it was never universally effective; at least
thirty percent of brickmakers continued to burn debris throughout.
9 Modifications generally consisted of reinforcing kiln walls, rebuilding the firebox with high quality brick,
and/or changing the height of the fire box.  Fifty-four percent of the adopters in our sample made such
modifications.Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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3.   THE LITERATURE
This section briefly reviews relevant findings from the thin academic literature on the
adoption of clean technologies in developing countries, as well as related literatures on the
adoption of clean technologies in industrialized countries, and on the adoption of small-scale
productivity-enhancing technologies in developing countries.
The literature identifies two determinants of technological change that are unique to
clean technologies:  regulatory pressure and awareness of the private health benefits of
adoption.  The link between formal regulatory pressure and clean technological change is
well-established in the theoretical literature (for a review, see Ecchia and Mariotti, 1994) and
recently, a number of researchers have found some empirical evidence for it (e.g., Jaffe and
Stavins, 1995).  Even though financial and institutional constraints often preclude effective
formal environmental regulation in developing countries (World Bank, 1992), a growing body
of recent research shows that community pressure -- also known as "informal regulation" --
applied by private-sector groups such as neighborhood organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and trade unions can substitute for formal regulatory pressure.  For example,
Pargal and Wheeler (1996) analyze data on releases of water pollution by Indonesian factories
during a period when there was no effective national regulation for water pollution and find
that lower releases were correlated with a set of proxies for community pressure including per
capita income, education, and population density in the vicinity of the plant (see also,
Hartman et al., 1997).
A second potential determinant of clean technological change is awareness of the
private health benefits associated with adoption.  For example, in a review of studies on the
determinants of the adoption of improved cooking stoves in developing countries, Barnes
et al. (1993) found that adopters often perceived reduced exposure to smoke to be the
principal advantage of new stoves.  Similarly, research on the diffusion of low-chemical pest
control technologies shows that farmers often view reduced exposure to chemicals as an
important benefit of adoption (e.g., Antle and Pingali, 1994).
The well-developed empirical and theoretical literature on the adoption of small-scale
productivity-enhancing innovations in developing countries (for reviews, see Fransman and
King, 1984; and Feder, et al., 1985) identifies a number of determinants of adoption that are
potentially relevant including:  input prices, firm size, credit availability, and human capital.
Obviously, firms that face different input prices will have different technological preferences.
For example, firms with access to cheap labor may prefer relatively labor intensive
technologies (e.g., Hill, 1983).
The majority of the evidence indicates that large firms adopt many new technologies
faster than small ones (e.g., Hayami, 1984).  The most obvious explanation is that adoption
involves fixed costs that imply economies of scale.  Fixed costs may arise from a capital
indivisibility or from more subtle informational and transactions costs (Feder et al., 1985).
Considerable evidence suggests that  lack of access to credit is a binding constraint on
technological change for small firms (e.g., Levy, 1993) even when fixed pecuniary costs of
adoption are not large (e.g., Bhalla, 1979).Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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Finally, there is a good deal of empirical evidence to support a positive correlation
between adoption of new technologies on one hand and human capital as proxied by either
education, experience, or exposure to extension services on the other (e.g., Lin, 1991).
4.   MODEL
This section develops analytical and econometric models of a brickmaker's choice
between a clean firing technology and a dirty firing technology that formalize the discussion of
the determinants of clean technological change in section three.  We assume that each
brickmaker chooses a firing technology and a vector of input quantities to minimize the
discounted present value of the total cost of firing a kiln-load of pre-molded bricks subject to a
production function.  Brickmakers choose between a clean technology and a dirty one indexed
by i ˛ (c,d).  Time is indexed by t = (0,1...t).  Total costs are comprised of variable costs and
fixed costs.  Variable costs, paid by both adopters and non-adopters, are equal to the dot
product of a vector of input quantities, Xit, and a vector of input prices, Vit.  In addition,
adopters must pay a one-time fixed cost of  adoption which is broken down into two
components:  (1) non-pecuniary fixed transactions and learning costs, Tc0(•), and (2) pecuniary
fixed costs, Fc0(•).  Non-adopters obviously do not pay fixed adoption costs but must pay fixed
perceived health costs, Hdt, and fixed regulatory costs, Rdt(•), in each period.  All recurrent
costs -- Hdt, Rdt(•), and XitVit -- are discounted using a subjective discount rate, q.
Some of the fixed costs are functions of underlying brickmaker characteristics.
Pecuniary fixed costs are assumed to be decreasing in wealth, "wt", since poor brickmakers
lack collateral that would enable them to finance investment at prime interest rates.  In
addition, pecuniary fixed costs are assumed to be increasing in output, "yt", since larger kilns
require more modification.  Non-pecuniary fixed costs are assumed to be decreasing in human
capital, "ut", since more educated and experienced brickmakers learn the new technology
more quickly.  Finally, regulatory costs are assumed to be an increasing function of formal
government regulatory pressure, "gt", and community pressure, "ot".
The restricted production function, yit(Xit;ut,kt) is a twice differentiable, increasing
concave function of input quantities holding constant levels of human capital and physical
capital, "kt".
Thus the brickmaker's optimization problem may be written,
￿
t
q - + + + +
0
0 0 0 0 0 ) ( ) , ( )] , ( [ min
) , (
u T w y F dt e o g R H i i
t






yt = yt(Xit;ut,kt) (t = 0, 1, ... t)
where for non-adopters,
Fd0(w0,y0) = Td0(u0) = 0,
and for adopters,Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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Hct = Rct(gt,ot) = 0. (t = 0, 1, ... t).
The brickmaker will choose vectors of cost-minimizing input quantities for each period, that,
in turn, imply restricted (variable) cost functions of the form
Cit(kt,ut,Vit,yt)  i = (c,d), t = (0, 1, ... t). (2)
Thus, the present discounted value of minimized total costs for each technology may be written,
Di(gt,kt,ot,ut,Vit,w0,yt) =
    ) , ( ) ( ) , ( )] , ( ) , , , ( [
0
0 0 0 0 0 d c i u T w y F dt e o g R H y u k C i i
t
t t it it t it t t it = + + + + ￿
t
q - V .  (3)
In order to be able to write Di as a  function of period 0 costs, we assume that brickmakers
know the intertemporal paths of the costs Hct, Rct, and Cit.10  More specifically, we assume
that the time path of each of these costs may be described by an equation of the form
Rct = Rc0fR(t),
where fR(t) is a bounded, non-negative function of time.  Then total minimized costs may be
written,
Di(g0,Hi0,k0,o0,u0,Vi0,w0,y0) =
   SiCCi0(k0,u0,Vi0,y0) + SRRi0(g0,o0) + SHHi0 + Fi0(w0,y0) + Ti0(u0)        i = (c,d) (4)
where
dt e t f S
dt e t f S
























) , ( ) (
The brickmaker chooses between the two technologies by calculating the difference
between the present discounted value of the minimized total costs associated with each, a
quantity we shall call I*, that is
                                               
10 We require a model in which Di is a function of period 0 costs because we do not have a panel of data that
would enable us to estimate a true intertemporal model.  The assumption that brickmakers know the intertemporal
path of costs is less restrictive than the alternative assumptions that yield the same result: (a) agents choose a
technology by simply comparing the costs and benefits that accrue in the period 0 (e.g., Lin, 1991; Shrestha and
Gopalakrishnan, 1993) or (b) costs are stationary, in which case agents' input demands are identical in each period
and the intertemporal model collapses to a static one.  We are grateful to Billy Pizer for discussions on this point.Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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I* = Dd(g0,Hd0,k0,o0,u0,Vd0,y0) - Dc(k0,u0,Vc0,w0,y0). (5)
The brickmaker will adopt as long as I* > 0.  Using equation (4), I* may be written as,
I* = SdCCd0(k0,u0,Vd0,y0) - ScCCc0(k0,u0,Vc0,y0)
+ {SHHi0 + SRRi0(g0,o0) - Fi0(w0,y0) - Ti0(u0)}. (6)
Our econometric model is a reduced form of equation (6).11  We estimate,
I*j = ßdC*dj - ßcC*cj + Zjg g + ej (7)
where:
j  indexes individual brickmaking firms
I*j is an unobserved latent variable
C*dj is firm j's true variable cost of using the dirty technology
C*cj is firm j's true variable cost of using the clean technology
Zj is a vector of firm-specific variables that influence fixed costs
ßi is a parameter
g g is a vector of parameters, and
ej is an error term.12
Though I*j is latent and unobserved, we do observe an indicator variable, Ij, which takes the
value of one if the clean technology is adopted and zero otherwise, that is, we observe,
Ij = 1 if I*j > 0,
Ij = 0 if I*j £ 0.
Note that the observed variable cost depends on whether the brickmaker has adopted, that is
we observe
C*cj  if I*j  > 0
C*dj  if I*j £ 0
                                               
11 Our model is similar to those used by Pitt and Sumodiningrat (1991) and Shrestha and Gopalakrishnan (1993).
12 Note that in order to be able to estimate the model with our data, we are forced to make a number of
assumptions and abstractions.  First, we implicitly assume that the discount factors, SiCj, SHj, and SRj, and therefore
discount rates, qj, are constant across brickmakers.  We note, however, that the literature suggests that discount
rates may vary considerably across producers (Pender, 1997).  Second, we abstract entirely from uncertainty which
is often a significant influence on investment decisions (Pindyck, 1991) and may have been a factor here given
movements in propane prices.  If uncertainty about propane prices did discourage adoption, then our model is mis-
specified since our measure of the stream of variable costs associated with the clean technology, C*cj, does not
include the monetized utility costs of this uncertainty.  As a result, ßc may be biased away from zero.  Finally, we
abstract from variations in producers risk attitudes which may also have been significant (Antle, 1987).Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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but we never observe both C*cj and C*dj.  Therefore, in order to generate the variable cost
terms in equation (7) for the entire sample, we estimate variable cost functions for adopters
and nonadopters.  We employ a simple restricted Cobb-Douglas functional form:
C*cj = ac + Pcj ¶ ¶c + Kjy yc + fcYj + hcj (8)
C*dj = ad + Pdj ¶ ¶d + Kjy yd + fdYj + hdj (9)
where:
Pij is a row vector of logarithms of variable input prices for each firm, some of
which depend on i, the index of c, d
Kj is a row vector of measures of fixed factors
Yj is the logarithm output
ai is a parameter
fi is a parameter
¶ ¶i is a vector of parameters
y yi is a vector of parameters, and
hij is an error term.
Equations (7), (8) and (9) constitute a simultaneous equation model.  A simple
recursive approach -- estimating equations (8) and (9) using ordinary least squares, using the
parameters to generate the relative cost terms on the right hand side of the adoption equation,
and finally estimating the adoption equation as a probit -- will not, in general, yield consistent
parameter estimates due to sample selection bias.  Technically, selection bias exists if the
expected values of the error terms in the cost regressions conditional on the choice of
technology are non-zero, that is, if E(hij | Ij = 1) „ 0.  Intuitively, selection bias may arise
because we do not observe both C*cj and C*dj for each brickmaker in the sample; we observe
C*cj only for one subset of the sample (adopters) and C*dj only for a second subset (non-
adopters).  These subsets are not likely to be randomly constituted.  Rather, the group of
adopters may well posses certain unobserved characteristics such as managerial skills and
political ties that predispose them to have relatively low costs no matter which technology
they use.  Therefore, in a simple recursive model, selection bias could generate a spurious
correlation between variable cost and adoption.
To correct for possible selection bias we use the two-stage estimation procedure
proposed by Lee (1981).  The object is to adjust the error terms of the cost functions so that
they have zero means.  In the first stage, we substitute equation (8) and equation (9) into
equation (7) to obtain a reduced form adoption equation,
I*j =  Pjl l1 + Kjl l2 + l3Yj + Zjl l4 + uj (10)
where the l's are parameters or vectors of parameters and uj is an error term.  In the second
stage we use OLS to estimate,Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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Ccj = ac + Pcj¶ ¶c  + Kjy yc + fcYj + dc{-n(pj)/N(pj)} +  mcj (11)
Cdj = ad + Pdj¶ ¶d  + Kjy yd + fdYj + dd{n(pj)/[1-N(pj)]} +  mdj (12)
where N(•) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal, n(•) is its density
function, pj is the predicted value of the indicator variable in (10), and di is a parameter.  As
long as the joint density of hcj, hdj, and uj is multivariate  normal, these modified cost
functions will have the property that E(mij | Ij = 1) = E(mij | Ij = 0) = 0 and will yield consistent
parameter estimates.  We use equations (11) and (12) to generate the predicted cost terms.
Finally, we estimate equation (7) as a simple probit.
5.   DATA AND VARIABLES
We use data from an original July 1995 survey of the owners or managers of ninety-
five traditional brick kilns in Cd. Juárez.13  Nineteen records were later dropped because of
missing information, leaving seventy-six complete records.  Table 1 presents summary
statistics for the complete sample as well as for subsamples of adopters (n = 47) and non-
adopters (n = 29).  Since by July of 1995, virtually every brickmaker in Cd. Juárez who had
been using propane had already reverted to debris (again, due to the elimination of subsidies
on propane) the survey solicited recall data for a uniform 'base' month -- October 1993 --
judged to be the month during which most brickmakers in Cd. Juárez were using propane.
To estimate cost functions we use data on six variables: output (CAPKLN), two variable
inputs, labor (L) and fuel (F), a measure of physical capital, truck ownership (TRK), and two
measures of human capital, years making bricks (BKYRS), and years of formal education
(EDYRS).  Output is measured as the average number of standard size bricks produced per firing
less breakage (output is equal to kiln capacity since the kiln is only fired when full).  Therefore,
inputs are measured in units per firing.  Quantity of labor is measured as the total number of
workers used to fire the kiln adjusted for the contribution of the owner.  If the kiln is fired with
family or non-paid labor, wages are those that the owner reported he would have paid for hired
labor.  Wages are in pesos ($N) per laborer per firing.14  For propane, quantity is measured in
thousands of liters per firing.  Prices are in pesos per thousand liters.  For debris, quantity data
                                               
13 The survey was administered by personal interview.  The interviews were conducted by the two co-authors
and four paid assistants.  Eighty-nine percent of the respondents in our sample were kiln owners and the
remainder were managers.  We interviewed managers only when kilns had absentee owners and declined to
interview hired workers when managers were absent.  Because they were relatively inaccessible, we did not
sample in three of the eight brickmaking colonias in Cd. Juárez -- Anapra, Fronteriza Baja, and Senecu 2.
According to the Municipal Environmental Authority, only nine percent of the kilns in Cd. Juárez are located in
these colonias (Dirección Municipal de Ecología de Cd. Juárez, 1995).
14 Note that most of the tasks involved in brickmaking other than firing -- molding bricks, loading and unloading
the kiln, and transporting bricks -- are performed by hired laborers who are paid standard piece rates.  As a result,
there is very little variation in the per brick costs of these tasks across firms.  Moreover, these tasks are
functionally independent from firing.  For these reasons, we assume that the cost function is separable between
firing and the 'piece rate tasks' and disregard the latter.  Thus, the cost function gives the variable costs of firing
holding all other costs constant.Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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was poor as the common metric was a truckload of variable size.  We used survey data on total
cost of debris per firing and price per truckload to derive quantity measured in an arbitrary unit
we call truckloads.  Prices are in pesos per truckload.







Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Endogenous
LPG Adopt (1/0) 1 0 0 0 0.62 0.49
VC Variable cost ($N) 927.05 297.64 380.65 174.84 718.55 370.16
Exogenous
BKYRS Experience (yrs.) 18.04 10.98 12.33 8.91 15.86 10.56
EDYRS Education (yrs.) 3.54 2.87 2.69 2.75 3.22 2.84
GREG Aware govt. regs. (1/0) 0.74 0.44 0.79 0.41 0.76 0.43
HEALTH LPG "healthier" (1/0) 0.17 0.38 0.03 0.19 0.12 0.33
HOUSE Owns house (1/0) 0.87 0.34 0.83 0.38 0.86 0.35
CAPKLN Capac. kiln (1000 bricks) 10.62 3.10 8.38 2.44 9.76 3.05
LORGPRI Member PRI affil. (1/0) 0.60 0.50 0.21 0.41 0.44 0.50
LD-SAT Colonia Satelite (1/0) 0.32 0.47 0.03 0.19 0.21 0.41
LD-M68 Colonia México 68 (1/0) 0.28 0.45 0.52 0.51 0.37 0.49
LD-K20 Colonia Kilo. 20 (1/0) 0.17 0.38 0.41 0.50 0.26 0.44
LD-FV/DN Colonia F.V./D.N. (1/0) 0.23 0.43 0.03 0.19 0.15 0.37
PL Price labor ($N/firing) 104.06 34.45 97.14 53.21 101.42 42.39
PFP Price LPG ($N/1000 l) 414.77 117.22 n/a n/a 414.77 117.22
PFD Price debris ($N/tkld) n/a n/a 147.37 70.17 147.37 70.17
TRK Owns truck (1/0) 0.85 0.36 0.66 0.48 0.78 0.42
To estimate the probit adoption function, we use data on thirteen variables that are
associated with fixed health, regulatory, and transactions costs in the manner hypothesized in
the analytical model presented in section three above.  Recall that fixed regulatory costs for
the dirty technology are hypothesized to depend on both formal regulatory pressure and
community pressure and, as discussed in section two, both types of pressure seem to have had
some real impact.  Unfortunately, finding a good exogenous firm-specific measure of formal
regulatory pressure proved difficult.  The most easily observed measure, incidences of
enforcement, is obviously correlated with adoption since non-adopters are more likely to have
experienced such incidences.  We use a dichotomous variable that indicates simple knowledge
of the existence of laws banning certain types of fuel (GREG).
Our proxy for community pressure, a dichotomous variable indicating membership in
a PRI affiliated local organization (LORGPRI), purports to capture the pressure that PRI
affiliates applied on their members to adopt propane.  Recall that forty-four percent of the
brickmakers in our sample belonged to PRI-affiliated neighborhood and trade organizationsBlackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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which actively cooperated with efforts to promote the adoption of propane, in some cases
enforcing strict rules on permissible fuels.
To proxy for perceived fixed health costs associated with burning debris we use a
dichotomous variable (HEALTH) indicating an affirmative response to the question, "is
burning propane healthier than burning debris?"
Recall that in the analytical model, fixed pecuniary transactions costs associated with
adoption of the clean technology are a function of firm size and wealth, while non-pecuniary
fixed transactions costs are a function of human capital.  We use kiln capacity (CAPKLN) to
proxy for firm size.  To measure wealth we use a dummy variable for home ownership,
(HOUSE).  We use the same measures of human capital in the adoption regression as in the
cost functions:  years making bricks (BKYRS) and years of formal education (EDYRS).
Finally, we control for fixed location effects in a separate model using location
dummies for colonia Satelite (LD-SAT), colonia México 68 (LD-M68), colonia Kilómetro 20
(LD-K20), and an amalgamation of two small neighboring colonias, Francisco Villa and
División del Norte (LD-FV/DN).
6.   RESULTS
Table 2 presents the OLS selectivity corrected estimates of the parameters of the cost
functions.  Recall that the selectivity term is constructed from the residuals of a reduced form
probit (equation 10) and as a result, depends on the specification of the adoption equation.
Therefore, we report cost function parameter estimates for each of our two adoption models.
For adopters, regression results are consistent across both models.  Estimated coefficients
for both input prices are significantly different from zero at the one percent level and have the
expected sign.  None of the coefficients on either the output or the capital measures are
significantly different from zero.  The selectivity variable is significant in model two.
For non-adopters, the estimated coefficient for labor prices is significantly different from
zero at the one percent level and has the expected sign in both models.  However, the coefficient
for fuel prices is not significantly different from zero in either model.  The most likely explanation
is that, having been imputed from total costs, debris prices were measured with error.15 None of
the coefficients on the output or capital measures are significantly different from zero.  The
coefficient for selectivity variable is significantly different from zero in model one.
The cost functions confirm evidence indicating that propane was considerably more
costly to use than debris.  For the two models, the average ratio of the mean predicted variable
cost of firing with propane to the mean predicted variable cost of firing with debris, is 2.13
(see Table 6).  Evidently, any savings in labor costs that accrued to propane users were
swamped by the higher energy costs.
                                               
15 Measurement error would also explain why estimated cost shares for fuel seem to be biased downwards: the
estimates are thirteen percent and eighteen percent while the actual average cost share is fifty-seven percent.Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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Table 2:  Cost Function Estimates Corrected for Selection Bias
Adopter Non-adopter



































































Sample size 47 47 29 29
F value 5.667 6.839 4.060 3.003
Adj. R
2 0.378 0.432 0.396 0.300
**  significant at 1% level two tailed test
*  significant at 5% level two tailed test
†  significant at 10% level two tailed test
Table 3 reports the results of the two probit adoption models.  Of our proxies for non-
pecuniary transactions costs associated with adoption -- years of experience (BKYRS) and
years of education (EDYRS) -- the coefficient on the former has the expected sign and is
significantly different from zero at the one percent level in both models, and coefficient on the
latter has the expected sign and is significantly different from zero at the five percent level in
the second model.16  Thus, more experienced brickmakers and more highly educated ones
were more likely to adopt.
The coefficients on our proxies for pecuniary transactions costs associated with
adoption -- house ownership (HOUSE) and kiln size (CAPKLN) -- are insignificant in both
models.  This result is not surprising.  Other studies have found that wealth and firm size are
correlated with adoption when adoption entails substantial fixed pecuniary costs that large
                                               
16 The insignificance of years of education in model one which does not control for location effects suggests
that this variable is a good predictor of adoption within colonias but not across them.Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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wealthy firms can pay more easily than small poor firms.  But in the present case, local
community groups heavily subsidized the fixed pecuniary costs of adoption by providing free
propane equipment, greatly reducing the advantages conferred by size and wealth.17
Table 3:  Probit Adoption Function Estimates









































LORGPRI Member PRI affiliate 0.908*
(0.414)
0.481 0.502
LD-SAT Colonia Satelite 0.033
(1.045)
LD-M68 Colonia México 68 -1.916*
(0.817)
LD-K20 Colonia Kilo. 20 -1.383*
(0.796)
Sample Size 76 76
Log Likelihood -35.421 -29.267
**  significant at 1% level two tailed test
*  significant at 5% level two tailed test
†  significant at 10% level two tailed test
The coefficient on our proxy for the perceived fixed health costs associated with
burning debris, HEALTH, has the expected sign and is significantly different from zero at the
ten percent level in both models.  Though suggestive, this result should be interpreted
cautiously for two reasons.  First, only eight of the forty-seven adopters in our sample
                                               
17 Note that our finding that wealth is not a significant predictor of adoption is robust to our choice of a wealth
proxy.  Our data set includes dummy variables indicating whether each brickmaker owns a television, a fan, a
car, and a truck, and whether each has an alternative source of income.  When substituted for HOUSE in the
adoption regressions, none of these dummy variables were significantly correlated with adoption.Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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believed that firing with propane was healthier than firing with debris, so that this belief can
not have played a role in the adoption decisions of most brickmakers.  Second, this result does
not necessarily imply that brickmakers who believed that burning propane was relatively
healthy adopted propane as a result.  The causation may have run in the opposite direction;
adopters may have concluded that propane was healthier than debris after they adopted.
The coefficients on our predicted variable costs terms are not significantly different
from zero in either model.  We strongly suspect that at bottom this result stems from the fact
that, though our price and quantity data are undoubtedly noisy, true cross-sectional variation
in factor prices and factor productivities was limited because factor markets within Cd. Juárez
were competitive and simple firing technologies were more or less uniform across
brickmakers.  As a result, the ratio of the per-brick variable costs associated with the two
technologies was approximately 2 to 1 for all brickmakers.  Hence, cross-sectional differences
in variable costs did not drive the pattern of adoption observed in October 1993.  Rather, this
pattern was shaped by cross-sectional differences in fixed costs, namely, regulatory costs,
perceived health costs, learning costs, and transactions costs.18
Given the evident lack of true cross-sectional variation in variable costs, our cross-
sectional analysis can not tell us much about the sensitivity of adoption to changes in variable
costs.  However, we can get a rough idea of this sensitivity by noting that in July 1995, by
which time propane had disappeared from the brickyards of Cd. Juárez, the ratio of the per-
brick variable costs of using propane vs. debris was twenty-five percent higher than it had
been in late 1993 when the majority of brickmakers were using propane (see Table 6).19
Thus, the 2 to 1 ratio of per brick variable costs that existed in October 1993 was probably
approximately the maximum that was politically sustainable.
The coefficient on our proxy for the formal regulatory costs associated with burning
debris, GREG, is not significantly different from zero in either model.  We suspect that the
data for GREG was corrupted by measurement error.  Though almost one quarter of our
survey respondents claimed to have been ignorant of any formal regulation regarding
permissible fuels, leading us to believe that GREG would be a good proxy for formal
regulatory pressure, there are indications that a number of these respondents were feigning
ignorance, perhaps because they were hesitant to admit awareness of rules that had been
violated.  If this is in fact what happened (i.e., if virtually the entire sample was aware of
government regulation), then GREG, even if accurately measured, would not be a particularly
good proxy for formal regulation.
                                               
18 Note that this finding does not imply that intertemporal changes in variable costs had no effect on brickmakers'
adoption decisions -- they obviously did -- only that cross-sectional variation in variable costs does not explain
which brickmakers had adopted in October 1993, and which had not.
19 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this comparison.  For 1995 factor quantities, we used
1993 values.  For 1995 debris and labor prices, we used actual survey data on 1995 prices.  For 1995 propane
prices, we used 1993 values adjusted by a growth factor based on a propane price series that FEMAP has
provided.  Finally, we assumed that kiln capacity, years of education, years of brickmaking experience, number
of trucks are the 1993 levels.Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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Finally, in model one, our proxy for the informal regulatory costs associated with
burning debris, LORGPRI, is significantly different from zero at the five percent level.  This
suggests that community pressure brought to bear by PRI-affiliated local organizations played
an important role in brickmakers' adoption decisions.
But alternative explanations are possible.  Since membership in PRI-affiliated local
organizations is correlated with location (see Table 4), LORGPRI may proxy for location-
specific effects that promote adoption.  To test this hypothesis, we introduce location
dummies in model two.  In this new model, the coefficient on LORGPRI is not significantly
different from zero but the coefficients on two of the three location dummies are.  This
suggests that location-specific effects were in fact important.
Table 4: Survey Respondents, Percent Adopters, and Percent PRI
Affiliate Members by Colonia
Colonia Survey Respondents % Adopters % PRI affiliate members
México 68 28 46† 36
Kilómetro 20 20 40* 20*
Satelite 16 58 58†
F.Villa /D.d.Norte 12 92* 42
All 76 62 43
(n=76)
† (*) significantly different from sample mean at 10% (5%) level
What exactly were these location-specific effects?  One candidate is localized
information dissemination, long a principal focus of technology diffusion research (e.g.,
Mansfield, 1961).  Put more concretely, the spatial concentration of adoption may have
stemmed from the fact that brickmakers in colonias where a select few adopted early on were
able to acquire information about the new technology from their neighbors at relatively low
cost and were therefore apt to adopt themselves.
A second possibility is that the spatial concentration of adoption arose from a type of
community pressure that is not captured by LORGPRI: the pressure to switch to propane that
adopters placed on all non-adopters--regardless of their political affiliation--to avoid being
undercut by brickmakers using cheap dirty fuels.  The intensity of this pressure would have been
location-specific since the proportion of adopters differed markedly across colonias (see Table 4).
A third possibility is that community pressure applied by local organization did
actually drive the spatial pattern of adoption, but that location dummies capture this effect
better than LORGPRI.  This could happen if, in colonias like Fransisco Villa that wereBlackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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dominated by PRI affiliates, PRI leaders were able to induce brickmakers of all political
persuasions to adopt.20
Ultimately, our data does not allow us to disentangle the impacts of localized
information dissemination and community pressure in the econometric analysis.  However,
additional survey data supports the hypothesis that community pressure was in fact an
important, if not a critical, determinant of adoption.  Twenty-five percent of the adopters we
surveyed identified "outside pressure" as the "most important" factor affecting their decision
to adopt, as high a percentage as chose any other factor, while only nine percent picked
"information provided by various parties" (see Table 5).  In addition, sixty-four percent of the
forty-eight local organization members we surveyed said that a local organization (not
necessarily their own) had an influence on their current (July 1995) choice of fuels, and a
third of these respondents volunteered the information that the local organization prohibited
the use of dirty fuels such as tires and plastics.  We would expect that, in October 1993 at the
height of the propane initiative, pressures applied by local organizations to burn clean fuels
would have been stronger and more pervasive.
Table 5.  Seven Factors Affecting Adoption:
Percent of adopters identifying each as "most important"
Factor Percent
Outside pressure 25
Good for environment 25
Access to free LPG equipment 21
Info. provided by city, et al. 9
LPG is more convenient 8




Table 6:  Average Predicted Variable Costs of Using
Propane and Debris per 1000 Bricks ($N)*





*Average for models 1 and 2.
                                               
20 Access to propane equipment did not differ significantly across colonias, and is therefore not likely to have
driven the spatial concentration of adoption.  Our survey data suggests that access to equipment was universal;
every adopter in our sample acknowledged using free equipment and no non-adopters cited lack of access to
equipment as having played a role in their decision not to adopt.Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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7.   CONCLUSION
To sum up briefly, our econometric results indicate that, first, on average, the variable
cost of burning propane was over two times greater than the variable cost of burning debris in
October 1993.  Second, the adoption of propane was correlated with the brickmakers': human
capital, awareness of the health costs of burning debris, location, and (most likely) exposure
to community pressure.  And finally, for reasons discussed above, we observed no significant
correlation between adoption and our measures of the brickmakers': wealth, firm size,
exposure to government regulation, and variable costs.  What are the policy implications of
these findings?
One important implication is that it is possible to successfully promote the adoption of
a clean technology by intensely competitive informal firms even when the new technology
significantly increases variable costs and imposes considerable one-time fixed costs.  In Cd.
Juárez, this success was the result of an organized effort to simultaneously lower the fixed
costs of adoption and raise the costs of non-adoption by supplying equipment, training, and
education free of charge, and by ratcheting up both formal and informal penalties for
continuing to burn debris.
Our finding that the adoption of propane is likely to have been correlated with the
intensity of community pressure extends a growing body of recent research that shows that
even in countries where financial and institutional constraints preclude effective public-sector
monitoring and enforcement, community pressure can take up at least some of the slack.
Most of the existing research concerns large-scale polluters and some authors (e.g., Almeida,
1993) have suggested that since small-scale firms have a relatively low profile and are
generally viewed more sympathetically than large firms, they are not likely to be susceptible
to community pressure.  Our findings suggest otherwise.
Ironically, one reason that community pressure may work in the informal sector has to
do with the intense competition among small-scale firms.  In Cd. Juárez, adopters were at a
competitive disadvantage compared to non-adopters.  Therefore, they had an incentive to
ensure that, at very least, neighbors and fellow union members switched to propane as well.
This suggests that, in general, if enough informal firms can be convinced by hook or crook to
adopt a clean technology, eventually competition will ensure that diffusion becomes self
perpetuating, even if the clean technology is cost increasing.
Several qualifications regarding community pressure in the informal sector are in
order.  First, as discussed above, since we are not able to disentangle the impacts of location-
specific information effects from community pressure our results must be interpreted
cautiously.  Second, our results should not be interpreted as evidence that community pressure
can be effective absent public sector support since in Cd. Juárez the municipal government
was instrumental in providing both carrots and sticks that led PRI affiliated organizations to
cooperate with the propane effort.  Third, in our case study, effective community pressure
depended largely on the fact that neighbors could easily observe violations because they could
see or smell emissions from burning debris.  Other types of informal sector pollution, such as
the dumping of waste oil into sewers by mechanics is not as easy to detect.Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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Finally, our finding that the adoption of propane was correlated with human capital
and was weakly correlated with the perception that burning debris is relatively unhealthy
echoes the conclusions of other studies of technological change in developing countries and
suggests that training and education, in particular the dissemination of information about the
health risks associated with dirty technologies, can be an effective means of promoting
adoption.Blackman and Bannister RFF 97-16-REV
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